世界武術搏擊運動分享

始計第一

孫子曰：兵者，國之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也。

故經之以五事，校之以計，而索其情：一曰道，二曰天，三曰地，四曰將，五曰法。

道者，令民與上同意也，固可與之死，可與之生，而不畏危；天者，陰陽、寒暑、時制也；地者，高下、遠近、險易、廣狹、死生也；將者，智、信、仁、勇、嚴也；法者，曲制、官道、主用也。凡此五者，將莫不聞，知之者勝，不知者不勝。

故校之以計，而索其情，曰：主孰有道？將孰有能？天地孰得？法令孰行？兵眾孰強？士卒孰練？賞罰孰明？吾以此知勝負矣。

將聽吾計，用之必勝，留之；將不聽吾計，用之必敗，去之。

計利以聽，乃為之勢，以佐其外。勢者，因利而制權也。

兵者，詭道也。故能而示之不能，用而示之不用，近而示之遠，遠而示之近。利而誘之，亂而取之，實而備之，強而避之，怒而撓之，卑而驕之，佚而勞之，親而離之，攻其無備，出其不意。此兵家之勝，不可先傳也。

夫未戰而廟算勝者，得算多也；未戰而廟算不勝者，得算少也。多算勝，少算不勝，而況于無算乎！吾以此觀之，勝負見矣。

作戰第二

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，馳車千駟，革車千乘，帶甲十萬，千里饋糧。則內外之費，賓客之用，膠漆之材，車甲之奉，日費千金，然後十萬之師舉矣。

其用戰也，貴勝，久則鈍兵挫銳，攻城則力屈，久暴師則國用不足。夫鈍兵挫銳，屈力殫貨，則諸侯乘其弊而起，雖有智者，不能善其後矣。故兵聞拙速，未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而國利者，未之有也。故不盡知用兵之害者，則不能盡知用兵之利也。

善用兵者，役不再籍，糧不三載，取用於國，因糧於敵，故軍食可足也。國之貧於師者遠輸，遠輸則百姓貧；近於師者貴賣，貴賣則百姓竭，財竭則急於丘役。力屈財殫，中原內虛於家，百姓之費，十去其七；公家之費，破軍罷馬，甲胄矢弩，戟楯矛櫓，丘牛大車，十去其六。

故智將務食於敵，食敵一鍾，當吾二十鍾；萁稈一石，當吾二十石。故殺敵者，怒也；取敵之利者，貨也。故車戰，得車十乘以上，賞其先得者，而更其旌旗。車雜而乘之，卒善而養之，是謂勝敵而益強。

故兵貴勝，不貴久。故知兵之將，民之司命。國家安危之主也。

謀攻第三

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，全國為上，破國次之；全軍為上，破軍次之；全旅為上，破旅次之；全卒為上，破卒次之；全伍為上，破伍次之。是故百戰百勝，非善之善者也；不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也。

故上兵伐謀，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城。攻城之法，為不得已。修櫓轒轀，具器械，三月而後成；距闉，又三月而後已。將不勝其忿，而蟻附之，殺士卒三分之一，而城不拔者，此攻之災也。

故善用兵者，屈人之兵，而非戰也，拔人之城而非攻也，毀人之國而非久也，必以全爭於天下，故兵不頓而利可全，此謀攻之法也。

故用兵之法，十則圍之，五則攻之，倍則分之，敵則能戰之，少則能逃之，不若則能避之。故小敵之堅，大敵之擒也。

夫將者，國之輔也。輔周則國必強，輔隙則國必弱。

故君之所以患於軍者三：不知軍之不可以進而謂之進，不知軍之不可以退而謂之退，是為縻軍；不知三軍之事，而同三軍之政，則軍士惑矣；不知三軍之權，而同三軍之任，則軍士疑矣。三軍既惑且疑，則諸侯之難至矣。是謂亂軍引勝。

故知勝有五：知可以戰與不可以戰者勝。識眾寡之用者勝。上下同欲者勝。以虞待不虞者勝。將能而君不御者勝。此五者，知勝之道也。

故曰：知己知彼，百戰不殆；不知彼而知己，一勝一負；不知彼不知己，每戰必殆。

軍形第四

孫子曰：昔之善戰者，先為不可勝，以待敵之可勝。不可勝在己，可勝在敵。故善戰者，能為不可勝，不能使敵必可勝。故曰：勝可知，而不可為。

不可勝者，守也；可勝者，攻也。守則不足，攻則有餘。善守者，藏於九地之下，善攻者，動於九天之上，故能自保而全勝也。

見勝不過眾人之所知，非善之善者也；戰勝而天下曰善，非善之善者也。故舉秋毫不為多力，見日月不為明目，聞雷霆不為聰耳。古之善戰者，勝於易勝者 也。故善戰者之勝也，無智名，無勇功，故其戰勝不忒。不忒者，其所措必勝，勝已敗者也。故善戰者，先立於不敗之地，而不失敵之敗也。是故勝兵先勝，而後求 戰，敗兵先戰而後求勝。善用兵者，修道而保法，故能為勝敗之政。

兵法：一曰度，二曰量，三曰數，四曰稱，五曰勝。地生度，度生量，量生數，數生稱，稱生勝。故勝兵若以鎰稱銖，敗兵若以銖稱鎰。勝者之戰，若決積水於千仞之谿者，形也。

兵勢第五

孫子曰：凡治眾如治寡，分數是也；鬥眾如鬥寡，形名是也；三軍之眾，可使必受敵而無敗者，奇正是也；兵之所加，如以碫投卵者，虛實是也。

凡戰者，以正合，以奇勝。故善出奇者，無窮如天地，不竭如江海。終而複始，日月是也。死而復生，四時是也。聲不過五，五聲之變，不可勝聽也；色不過 五，五色之變，不可勝觀也；味不過五，五味之變，不可勝嘗也；戰勢，不過奇正，奇正之變，不可勝窮也。奇正相生，如循環之無端，孰能窮之哉？

激水之疾，至於漂石者，勢也；鷙鳥之疾，至於毀折者，節也。是故善戰者，其勢險，其節短。勢如張弩，節如發機。

紛紛紜紜，鬥亂而不可亂也；渾渾沌沌，形圓而不可敗也。亂生於治，怯生於勇，弱生於強。治亂，數也；勇怯，勢也；強弱，形也。故善動敵者，形之，敵必從之；予之，敵必取之。以利動之，以卒待之。

故善戰者，求之於勢，不責於人；故能擇人而任勢。任勢者，其戰人也，如轉木石。木石之性，安則靜，危則動，方則止，圓則行。故善戰人之勢，如轉圓石於千仞之山者，勢也。

虛實第六

孫子曰：凡先處戰地而待敵者佚，後處戰地而趨戰者勞。

故善戰者，致人而不致於人。能使敵人自至者，利之也；能使敵人不得至者，害之也。故敵佚能勞之，飽能饑之，安能動之。出其所必趨，趨其所不意。行千里而不勞者，行於無人之地也；攻而必取者，攻其所不守也。守而必固者，守其所不攻也。

故善攻者，敵不知其所守；善守者，敵不知其所攻。微乎微乎，至於無形；神乎神乎，至於無聲，故能為敵之司命。進而不可禦者，沖其虛也；退而不可追 者，速而不可及也。故我欲戰，敵雖高壘深溝，不得不與我戰者，攻其所必救也；我不欲戰，雖畫地而守之，敵不得與我戰者，乖其所之也。故形人而我無形，則我 專而敵分。我專為一，敵分為十，是以十攻其一也。則我眾敵寡，能以眾擊寡者，則吾之所與戰者約矣。吾所與戰之地不可知，不可知則敵所備者多，敵所備者多， 則吾所與戰者寡矣。故備前則後寡，備後則前寡，備左則右寡，備右則左寡，無所不備，則無所不寡。寡者，備人者也；眾者，使人備己者也。故知戰之地，知戰之 日，則可千里而會戰；不知戰之地，不知戰日，則左不能救右，右不能救左，前不能救後，後不能救前，而況遠者數十裏，近者數裏乎！以吾度之，越人之兵雖多， 亦奚益於勝哉！故曰：勝可為也。敵雖眾，可使無鬥。故策之而知得失之計，作之而知動靜之理，形之而知死生之地，角之而知有餘不足之處。故形兵之極，至於無 形。無形則深間不能窺，智者不能謀。因形而措勝於眾，眾不能知。人皆知我所以勝之形，而莫知吾所以制勝之形。故其戰勝不復，而應形於無窮。夫兵形象水，水 之行避高而趨下，兵之形避實而擊虛；水因地而制流，兵因敵而制勝。故兵無常勢，水無常形。能因敵變化而取勝者，謂之神。故五行無常勝，四時無常位，日有短 長，月有死生。

軍爭第七

孫子曰： 凡用兵之法，將受命於君，合軍聚眾，交和而捨，莫難於軍爭。軍爭之難者，以迂為直，以患為利。故迂其途，而誘之以利，後人發，先人至，此知迂直之計者也。 軍爭為利，軍爭為危。舉軍而爭利則不及，委軍而爭利則輜重捐。是故卷甲而趨，日夜不處，倍道兼行，百里而爭利，則擒三將軍，勁者先，疲者後，其法十一而 至；五十裏而爭利，則蹶上將軍，其法半至；三十裏而爭利，則三分之二至。是故軍無輜重則亡，無糧食則亡，無委積則亡。故不知諸侯之謀者，不能豫交；不知山 林、險阻、沮澤之形者，不能行軍；不用鄉導者，不能得地利。故兵以詐立，以利動，以分和為變者也。故其疾如風，其徐如林，侵掠如火，不動如山，難知如陰， 動如雷震。掠鄉分眾，廓地分利，懸權而動。先知迂直之計者勝，此軍爭之法也。《軍政》曰：「言不相聞，故為之金鼓；視不相見，故為之旌旗。」夫金鼓旌旗 者，所以一民之耳目也。民既專一，則勇者不得獨進，怯者不得獨退，此用眾之法也。故夜戰多金鼓，晝戰多旌旗，所以變人之耳目也。三軍可奪氣，將軍可奪心。 是故朝氣銳，晝氣惰，暮氣歸。善用兵者，避其銳氣，擊其惰歸，此治氣者也。以治待亂，以靜待嘩，此治心者也。以近待遠，以佚待勞，以飽待饑，此治力者也。 無邀正正之旗，無擊堂堂之陳，此治變者也。故用兵之法，高陵勿向，背丘勿逆，佯北勿從，銳卒勿攻，餌兵勿食，歸師勿遏，圍師遺闕，窮寇勿迫，此用兵之法 也。

九變第八

孫子曰： 凡用兵之法，將受命於君，合軍聚合。泛地無舍，衢地合交，絕地無留，圍地則謀，死地則戰，途有所不由，軍有所不擊，城有所不攻，地有所不爭，君命有所不 受。故將通於九變之利者，知用兵矣；將不通九變之利，雖知地形，不能得地之利矣；治兵不知九變之術，雖知五利，不能得人之用矣。是故智者之慮，必雜於利 害，雜於利而務可信也，雜於害而患可解也。是故屈諸侯者以害，役諸侯者以業，趨諸侯者以利。故用兵之法，無恃其不來，恃吾有以待之；無恃其不攻，恃吾有所 不可攻也。故將有五危，必死可殺，必生可虜，忿速可侮，廉潔可辱，愛民可煩。凡此五者，將之過也，用兵之災也。覆軍殺將，必以五危，不可不察也。

行軍第九

孫子曰：凡處軍相敵，絕山依谷，視生處高，戰隆無登，此處山之軍也。絕水必遠水，客絕水而來，勿迎之于水內，令半濟而擊之利，欲戰者，無附于水而迎 客，視生處高，無迎水流，此處水上之軍也。絕斥澤，惟亟去無留，若交軍於斥澤之中，必依水草而背眾樹，此處斥澤之軍也。平陸處易，右背高，前死後生，此處 平陸之軍也。凡此四軍之利，黃帝之所以勝四帝也。凡軍好高而惡下，貴陽而賤陰，養生而處實，軍無百疾，是謂必勝。丘陵隄防，必處其陽而右背之，此兵之利， 地之助也。上雨水沫至，欲涉者，待其定也。凡地有絕澗、天井、天牢、天羅、天陷、天隙，必亟去之，勿近也。吾遠之，敵近之；吾迎之，敵背之。軍旁有險阻、 潢井、蒹葭、小林、蘙薈者，必謹覆索之，此伏奸之所處也。敵近而靜者，恃其險也；遠而挑戰者，欲人之進也；其所居易者，利也；眾樹動者，來也；眾草多障 者，疑也；鳥起者，伏也；獸駭者，覆也；塵高而銳者，車來也；卑而廣者，徒來也；散而條達者，樵采也；少而往來者，營軍也；辭卑而益備者，進也；辭強而進 驅者，退也；輕車先出居其側者，陳也；無約而請和者，謀也；奔走而陳兵者，期也；半進半退者，誘也；杖而立者，饑也；汲而先飲者，渴也；見利而不進者，勞 也；鳥集者，虛也；夜呼者，恐也；軍擾者，將不重也；旌旗動者，亂也；吏怒者，倦也；殺馬肉食者，軍無糧也；懸甀不返其舍者，窮寇也；諄諄翕翕，徐與人言 者，失眾也；數賞者，窘也；數罰者，困也；先暴而後畏其眾者，不精之至也；來委謝者，欲休息也。兵怒而相迎，久而不合，又不相去，必謹察之。兵非貴益多 也，惟無武進，足以併力料敵取人而已。夫惟無慮而易敵者，必擒於人。卒未親而罰之，則不服，不服則難用。卒已親附而罰不行，則不可用。故合之以文，齊之以 武，是謂必取。令素行以教其民，則民服；令素不行以教其民，則民不服。令素行者，與眾相得也。

地形第十

孫子曰：地形有通者、有掛者、有支者、有隘者、有險者、有遠者。我可以往，彼可以來，曰通。通形者，先居高陽，利糧道，以戰則利。可以往，難以返， 曰掛。掛形者，敵無備，出而勝之，敵若有備，出而不勝，難以返，不利。我出而不利，彼出而不利，曰支。支形者，敵雖利我，我無出也，引而去之，令敵半出而 擊之利。隘形者，我先居之，必盈之以待敵。若敵先居之，盈而勿從，不盈而從之。險形者，我先居之，必居高陽以待敵；若敵先居之，引而去之，勿從也。遠形 者，勢均難以挑戰，戰而不利。凡此六者，地之道也，將之至任，不可不察也。凡兵有走者、有馳者、有陷者、有崩者、有亂者、有北者。凡此六者，非天地之災， 將之過也。夫勢均，以一擊十，曰走；卒強吏弱，曰馳；吏強卒弱，曰陷；大吏怒而不服，遇敵懟而自戰，將不知其能，曰崩；將弱不嚴，教道不明，吏卒無常，陳 兵縱橫，曰亂；將不能料敵，以少合眾，以弱擊強，兵無選鋒，曰北。凡此六者，敗之道也，將之至任，不可不察也。夫地形者，兵之助也。料敵制勝，計險隘遠 近，上將之道也。知此而用戰者必勝，不知此而用戰者必敗。故戰道必勝，主曰無戰，必戰可也；戰道不勝，主曰必戰，無戰可也。故進不求名，退不避罪，唯民是 保，而利於主，國之寶也。視卒如嬰兒，故可以與之赴深溪；視卒如愛子，故可與之俱死。厚而不能使，愛而不能令，亂而不能治，譬若驕子，不可用也。知吾卒之 可以擊，而不知敵之不可擊，勝之半也；知敵之可擊，而不知吾卒之不可以擊，勝之半也；知敵之可擊，知吾卒之可以擊，而不知地形之不可以戰，勝之半也。故知 兵者，動而不迷，舉而不窮。故曰：知彼知己，勝乃不殆；知天知地，勝乃可全。

九地第十一

孫子曰：用兵之法，有散地，有輕地，有爭地，有交地，有衢地，有重地，有泛地，有圍地，有死地。諸侯自戰其地者，為散地；入人之地不深者，為輕地； 我得亦利，彼得亦利者，為爭地；我可以往，彼可以來者，為交地；諸侯之地三屬，先至而得天下眾者，為衢地；入人之地深，背城邑多者，為重地；山林、險阻、 沮澤，凡難行之道者，為泛地；所由入者隘，所從歸者迂，彼寡可以擊吾之眾者，為圍地；疾戰則存，不疾戰則亡者，為死地。是故散地則無戰，輕地則無止，爭地 則無攻，交地則無絕，衢地則合交，重地則掠，泛地則行，圍地則謀，死地則戰。古之善用兵者，能使敵人前後不相及，眾寡不相恃，貴賤不相救，上下不相收，卒 離而不集，兵合而不齊。合於利而動，不合於利而止。敢問敵眾而整將來，待之若何曰：先奪其所愛則聽矣。兵之情主速，乘人之不及。由不虞之道，攻其所不戒 也。凡為客之道，深入則專。主人不克，掠于饒野，三軍足食。謹養而勿勞，並氣積力，運兵計謀，為不可測。投之無所往，死且不北。死焉不得，士人盡力。兵士 甚陷則不懼，無所往則固，深入則拘，不得已則鬥。是故其兵不修而戒，不求而得，不約而親，不令而信，禁祥去疑，至死無所之。吾士無餘財，非惡貨也；無餘 命，非惡壽也。令發之日，士卒坐者涕沾襟，偃臥者涕交頤，投之無所往，諸、劌之勇也。故善用兵者，譬如率然。率然者，常山之蛇也。擊其首則尾至，擊其尾則 首至，擊其中則首尾俱至。敢問兵可使如率然乎？曰可。夫吳人與越人相惡也，當其同舟而濟而遇風，其相救也如左右手。是故方馬埋輪，未足恃也；齊勇如一，政 之道也；剛柔皆得，地之理也。故善用兵者，攜手若使一人，不得已也。將軍之事，靜以幽，正以治，能愚士卒之耳目，使之無知；易其事，革其謀，使人無識；易 其居，迂其途，使民不得慮。帥與之期，如登高而去其梯；帥與之深入諸侯之地，而發其機。若驅群羊，驅而往，驅而來，莫知所之。聚三軍之眾，投之於險，此謂 將軍之事也。九地之變，屈伸之力，人情之理，不可不察也。凡為客之道，深則專，淺則散。去國越境而師者，絕地也；四徹者，衢地也；入深者，重地也；入淺 者，輕地也；背固前隘者，圍地也；無所往者，死地也。是故散地吾將一其志，輕地吾將使之屬，爭地吾將趨其後，交地吾將謹其守，交地吾將固其結，衢地吾將謹 其恃，重地吾將繼其食，泛地吾將進其途，圍地吾將塞其闕，死地吾將示之以不活。故兵之情：圍則禦，不得已則鬥，過則從。是故不知諸侯之謀者，不能預交；不 知山林、險阻、沮澤之形者，不能行軍；不用鄉導，不能得地利。四五者，一不知，非霸王之兵也。夫霸王之兵，伐大國，則其眾不得聚；威加於敵，則其交不得 合。是故不爭天下之交，不養天下之權，信己之私，威加於敵，則其城可拔，其國可隳。施無法之賞，懸無政之令。犯三軍之眾，若使一人。犯之以事，勿告以言； 犯之以害，勿告以利。投之亡地然後存，陷之死地然後生。夫眾陷於害，然後能為勝敗。故為兵之事，在順詳敵之意，並敵一向，千里殺將，是謂巧能成事。是故政 舉之日，夷關折符，無通其使，厲於廊廟之上，以誅其事。敵人開闔，必亟入之，先其所愛，微與之期，踐墨隨敵，以決戰事。是故始如處女，敵人開戶；後如脫 兔，敵不及拒。

火攻第十二

孫子曰：凡火攻有五：一曰火人，二曰火積，三曰火輜，四曰火庫，五曰火隊。行火必有因，因必素具。發火有時，起火有日。時者，天之燥也。日者，月在 箕、壁、翼、軫也。凡此四宿者，風起之日也。凡火攻，必因五火之變而應之：火發於內，則早應之於外；火發而其兵靜者，待而勿攻，極其火力，可從而從之，不 可從則上。火可發於外，無待於內，以時發之，火發上風，無攻下風，晝風久，夜風止。凡軍必知五火之變，以數守之。故以火佐攻者明，以水佐攻者強。水可以 絕，不可以奪。夫戰勝攻取而不惰其功者凶，命曰“費留”。故曰：明主慮之，良將惰之，非利不動，非得不用，非危不戰。主不可以怒而興師，將不可以慍而攻 戰。合於利而動，不合於利而上。怒可以複喜，慍可以複說，亡國不可以複存，死者不可以複生。故明主慎之，良將警之。此安國全軍之道也。

用間第十三

孫子曰： 凡興師十萬，出征千里，百姓之費，公家之奉，日費千金，內外騷動，怠于道路，不得操事者，七十萬家。相守數年，以爭一日之勝，而愛爵祿百金，不知敵之情 者，不仁之至也，非民之將也，非主之佐也，非勝之主也。故明君賢將所以動而勝人，成功出於眾者，先知也。先知者，不可取於鬼神，不可象於事，不可驗於度， 必取於人，知敵之情者也。故用間有五：有因間，有內間，有反間，有死間，有生間。五間俱起，莫知其道，是謂神紀，人君之寶也。鄉間者，因其鄉人而用之；內 間者，因其官人而用之；反間者，因其敵間而用之；死間者，為誑事於外，令吾聞知之而傳於敵間也；生間者，反報也。故三軍之事，莫親於間，賞莫厚於間，事莫 密於間，非聖賢不能用間，非仁義不能使間，非微妙不能得間之實。微哉微哉！無所不用間也。間事未發而先聞者，間與所告者兼死。凡軍之所欲擊，城之所欲攻， 人之所欲殺，必先知其守將、左右、謁者、門者、舍人之姓名，令吾間必索知之。敵間之來間我者，因而利之，導而舍之，故反間可得而用也；因是而知之，故鄉 間、內間可得而使也；因是而知之，故死間為誑事，可使告敵；因是而知之，故生間可使如期。五間之事，主必知之，知之必在於反間，故反間不可不厚也。昔殷之 興也，伊摯在夏；周之興也，呂牙在殷。故明君賢將，能以上智為間者，必成大功。此兵之要，三軍之所恃而動也。

銀雀山佚文

吳問

四變

黃帝伐赤帝

地形二

見吳王

程兵

孫子敘錄

吳王問孫武曰：“散地士卒顧家，不可與戰，則必固守不出 。若敵攻我小城，掠吾田野，禁吾樵采，塞吾要道，待吾空 虛而急來攻，則如之何？” 武曰：“敵人深入吾都，多背城邑，士卒以軍為家，專志輕鬥 。吾兵在國，安土懷生，以陣則不堅，以鬥則不勝，當集人合 眾，聚穀蓄帛，保城備險，遣輕兵絕其糧道，彼挑戰不得，轉 輸不至，野無所掠，三軍困餒，因而誘之，可以有功。若與野 戰，則必因勢依險設伏，無險則隱於天氣，陰晦昏霧，出其不 意，襲擊懈怠，可以有功。” 吳王問孫武曰：“吾至輕地，始入敵境，士卒思還，難進易退 ，未背險阻，三軍恐懼，大將欲進，士卒欲退，上下異心，敵 守其城壘，整其軍騎，或當吾前，或擊吾後，則如之何？” 武曰：“軍至輕地，士卒未專，以入為務。無以戰為故，無近 其名城，無由其通路，設疑徉惑，示若將去，乃選騎銜枚先入 ，掠其牛馬六畜。三軍見得，進乃不懼。分吾良卒，密有所伏 。敵人若來，擊之勿疑。若其不至，舍之而去。” 吳王問孫武曰：“爭敵地先至，據要保利，簡兵練卒，或出或 守，以備我奇，則如之何？” 武曰：“爭地之法，讓之者得，爭之者失。敵得其處，慎勿攻 之。引而佯走，建旗鳴鼓，趨其所愛，曳柴揚塵，惑其耳目。 分吾良卒，密有所伏，敵必出救。人欲我與，人棄吾取。此爭 先之道。若我先至而敵用此術，則選吾銳卒，固守其所，輕兵 追之，分伏險阻。敵人還鬥，伏兵旁起，此全勝之道也。” 吳王問孫武曰：“交地，吾將絕敵，令不得來，必全吾邊城， 修其所備，深絕通道，固其隘塞。若不先圖，敵人已備，彼可 得來，而吾不可往，為寡又均，則如之何？” 武曰：“既我不可以往彼可以來，吾分卒匿之，守而易怠，示 其不能，敵人且至，設伏隱廬，出其不意，可以有功也。” 吳王問孫武曰：“衢地必先、吾道遠發後，雖馳車驟馬，至不 能先，則如之何？” 武曰：“諸侯參屬，其道四通，我與敵相當，而傍有國。所謂 先者，必重幣輕使，約和傍國，交親結恩，兵雖後至，為以屬 矣。簡兵練卒，阻利而處，親吾軍事，實吾資糧，令吾車騎出 入膽候。我有眾助，彼失其黨，諸國犄角，震鼓齊攻，敵人驚 恐，莫知所當。” 吳王問孫武曰：“吾引兵深入重地，多所逾越，糧道絕塞，設 欲歸還，勢不可過，欲食於敵，持兵不失，則如之何？” 武曰：“凡居重地，士卒輕勇，轉輪不通，則掠以繼食。下得 粟帛，皆貢於上，多者有賞，士無歸意。若欲還出，切實戒備 ，深溝高壘，示敵且久，敵疑通途，私除要害之道，乃令輕車 銜枚而行，塵埃氣揚，以牛馬為餌。敵人若出，鳴鼓隨之，陰 伏吾士，與之中期。內外相應，其敗可知。” 吳王問孫武曰：“吾入圮地，山川險阻，難從之道，行久卒勞 ，敵在吾前，而伏吾後，營居吾左，而守吾右，良車驍騎，要 吾隘道，則如之何？” 武曰：“先進輕車，去軍十裏，與敵相候。接期險阻，或分而 左，或分而右，大將四觀，擇空而取，皆會中道，倦而乃止。” 吳王問孫武曰：“吾入圍地，前有強敵，後有險難，敵絕糧道 ，利我走勢，敵鼓噪不進，以觀吾能，則如之何？” 武曰：“圍地之宜，必塞其闕，示無所往，則以軍?家，萬人同 心。三軍齊力，並炊數日，無見火煙，故?毀亂寡弱之形，敵人 見我，備之必輕。告勵士卒，令其奮怒。陣伏良卒，左右險阻， 擊鼓而出，敵人若當，疾擊務突，前鬥後拓，左右犄角。”又問 曰：“敵在吾圍，伏而深謀，示我以利，縈我以旗，紛紛若亂， 不知所之，奈何？” 武曰：“千人操旌，分塞要道，輕兵進挑，陣而勿搏，交而勿去 ，此敗謀之法。”（見通典。）

又曰：軍入敵境，敵人固壘不戰，士卒思歸，欲退且難，謂之輕地。當選驍騎伏要路，我退敵追，來則擊之也。吳王問孫武曰：“吾師出境，軍於敵人之地， 敵人大至，圍我數重。欲突以出，四塞不通，欲勵士勵眾，使之投命潰圍，則如之何？”武曰：“深溝高壘，示眾守備，安靜勿動，以隱吾能，告令三軍，示不得 已，殺牛燔車，以饗吾士，燒盡糧食，填夷井實，割發捐冠，絕去生慮，將無餘謀，士有死志，於是砥甲礪刃，並氣一力，或攻兩勞，震鼓疾噪，敵人亦懼，莫知所 當，銳卒分兵，疾攻其後，此是失道而求生。故曰：困而不謀者窮，窮而不戰者亡。”吳王曰：“若我圍敵，則如之何？”武曰：“山峻穀險，難以逾越，謂之窮 寇。擊之之法，伏卒隱廬，開其去道，示其走路，求生逃出，必無鬥志。因而擊之，雖眾必破。兵法又曰：若敵人在死地，士卒勇氣，欲擊之法，順而勿抗，陰守其 利，絕其糧道，恐有奇隱而不睹，使吾弓弩俱守其所。”（見何氏注。）

吳王問孫武曰：“敵勇不懼，驕而無虞，兵?而強，圖之奈何？”武曰：“詘而待之，以順其意，令無省覺，以益其懈怠。因敵遷移，潛伏候待，前行不膽，後往不顧，中而擊之，雖眾可取。攻驕之道，不可爭鋒。”（見通典）

吳王問孫武曰：“敵人保據山險，擅利而處之，糧食又足，挑之則不出，乘間則侵掠，為之奈何？」武曰：“分兵守要，謹備勿懈。潛探其情，密候其怠。以利誘之，禁其樵採。久無所得，自然變改。待離其固，奪其所愛，敵據險隘，我能破之也。”（見通典及太平御覽。）

孫子曰：“將者，智也，仁也，敬也，信也，勇也，嚴也。是故智以折敵，仁以附眾，敬以招賢，信以必賞，勇以益氣，嚴以一令。故折敵則能合變，?附則思力戰，賢智集則陰謀利，賞罰必則士盡力，氣勇益則兵威令自倍，威令一則惟將所使。”（見潛夫論）

孫子曰：“凡地多陷曲，曰天井。”（見通典）

孫子曰：“故曰：蓊穢者所以逃遁也，深谷險阻者所以止禦車騎也，隘塞山林者所以少擊眾也，沛澤杳冥者所以匿其形也。”（見通典）

孫子曰：“強弱長短雜用。”又曰：“遠則用弩，近則用兵，兵弩相解也。”又曰：“以步兵十人擊騎一匹。”（見通典）

孫子曰：“人效死而士能用之，雖優遊暇譽，令猶行也。”又曰：“長陣為甄。”又曰：“其鎮如缶，其停如淵。”（見文選注）

孫子八陣，有蘋車之乘。（見周禮鄭玄注）

孫子曰：“三軍將行，其旌旗從容以向前，是為天送，必亟擊之，得其大將。三軍將行，其旌旗墊然若雨，是為天沾，其帥失。三軍將行，旌旗亂於上，東西 南北，無所主方，其軍不還。三軍將陣，雨師，是為浴師，勿用陣戰。三軍將戰，有雲其上而赤，勿用陣，先陣戰者，莫複其眾。三軍將行，大風飄起於軍前，右周 絕，軍其將亡，右周中，其師得糧 。”（見太平御覽）

Section I: Laying Plans

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
4. These are:
   1. The Moral Law;
   2. Heaven;
   3. Earth;
   4. The Commander;
   5. Method and discipline.
5. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
6. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
7. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
8. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.
9. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
10. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
11. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--
12.  
    1. Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
    2. Which of the two generals has most ability?
    3. With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
    4. On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
    5. Which army is stronger?
    6. On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
    7. In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
13. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.
14. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!
15. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
16. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.
17. All warfare is based on deception.
18. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
19. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.
20. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
21. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
22. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.
23. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
24. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
25. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

Section II: Waging War

1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand mile, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.
6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away.
12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
13. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;
14. While government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.
16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.
19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

Section III: Attack by Stratagem

1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.
2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.
3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:--
13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.
15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
    1. He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
    2. He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
    3. He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
    4. He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
    5. He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

Section V: Energy

1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.
5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.
7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.
11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.
14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.
15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.
19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.
22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.
23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

Section IV: Tactical Dispositions

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.
8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"
10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.
16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

Section VI: Weak Points and Strong

1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted.
2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.
3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.
5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.
8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.
13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided.
14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.
15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.
20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are separated by several LI!
21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.
25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.
26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.
31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.
34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.

Section VII: Maneuvering

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.
2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.
3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.
7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.
11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.
14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.
15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.
16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest.
18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability like a mountain.
19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.
26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.
30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession.
31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.
32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances.
33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
37. Such is the art of warfare.

Section VIII: Variation in Tactics

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces
2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
3. There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.
6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.
8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.
10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.
12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
    1. Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
    2. cowardice, which leads to capture;
    3. a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
    4. a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
    5. over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

Section IX: The Army on the March

1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.
2. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.
3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.
4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.
5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.
6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. So much for river warfare.
7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt-marches.
9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and on your rear, so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country.
10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.
11. All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny places to dark.
12. If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, and this will spell victory.
13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground.
14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides.
15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be left with all possible speed and not approached.
16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear.
17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.
18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position.
19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance.
20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.
21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.
22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.
23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping.
24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat.
25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.
26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.
27. When there is much running about and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come.
28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.
29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food.
30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.
31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.
32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. Clamor by night betokens nervousness.
33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.
34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined to fight to the death.
35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.
36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.
37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.
39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.
41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.
43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory.
44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.

Section X: Terrain

1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit:
   1. Accessible ground;
   2. entangling ground;
   3. temporizing ground;
   4. narrow passes;
   5. precipitous heights;
   6. positions at a great distance from the enemy.
2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible.
3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you will be able to fight with advantage.
4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling.
5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.
6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground.
7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.
8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.
9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.
10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.
11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.
12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be to your disadvantage.
13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.
14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are:
    1. Flight;
    2. insubordination;
    3. collapse;
    4. ruin;
    5. disorganization;
    6. rout.
15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the flight of the former.
16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination. When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse.
17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or not he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin.
18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization.
19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be rout.
20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.
21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.
22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated.
23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.
24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.
25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.
26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.
27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.
30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.
31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.

Section XI: The Nine Situations

1. Sun Tzu said that the art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground:
   1. Dispersive ground;
   2. facile ground;
   3. contentious ground;
   4. open ground;
   5. ground of intersecting highways;
   6. serious ground;
   7. difficult ground;
   8. hemmed-in ground;
   9. desperate ground.
2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.
3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.
4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground.
5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.
6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways.
7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.
8. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.
10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.
11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.
12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.
13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. On desperate ground, fight.
15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear; to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men.
16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep them in disorder.
17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.
18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."
19. Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.
20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.
21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.
22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. Keep your army continually on the move, and devise unfathomable plans.
23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.
24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.
25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted.
26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.
27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity.
28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both.
30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right.
31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground
32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach.
33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that is a question involving the proper use of ground.
34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.
35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.
36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance.
37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going.
40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this may be termed the business of the general.
41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied.
42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion.
43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.
45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army.
47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.
48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.
49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.
50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.
52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.
53. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.
54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him.
55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue orders without regard to previous arrangements; and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man.
57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.
58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.
59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.
60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.
61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief.
62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.
63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries.
64. Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you may control the situation.
65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.
66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.
67. Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.
68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.

Section XII: The Attack by Fire

1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.
2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. The material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.
3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration.
4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind.
5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments:
6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond at once with an attack from without.
7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.
8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.
9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favorable moment.
10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.
11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls.
12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.
13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.
14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.
15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation.
16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.
17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.
18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.
19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.
20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.
21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.
22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.

Section XIII: The Use of Spies

1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor.
2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height of inhumanity.
3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory.
4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.
5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation.
6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.
7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes:
   1. Local spies;
   2. inward spies;
   3. converted spies;
   4. doomed spies;
   5. surviving spies.
8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.
9. Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.
10. Having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy.
11. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes.
12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.
13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp.
14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.
15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity.
16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.
17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.
18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business.
19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.
20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.
21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service.
22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.
23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.
24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions.
25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality.
26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to I Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served under the Yin.
27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. Spies are a most important element in water, because on them depends an army's ability to move.